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[Reproduced below are excerpts from a translation of an article by Prensa Latina correspondent
Francisco Ramirez appearing in daily newspapers Hoy (Bolivia) and El Nuevo Diario (Nicaragua),
and broadcast by Prensa Latina on March 19.] Mexican foreign debt negotiators are clearly
frustrated with the response of creditor banks to an ambitious debt-bond exchange program
devised to alleviate that country's voluminous foreign debt. Mexican officials have warned that
a confrontation is imminent, result of the creditors' lack of understanding and political will to
devise negotiated solutions to the debt problem. According to Mexico's principal debt negotiator,
Finance Secretariat director of public credit, Jose Angel Gurria, a rebellion in debtor nations is
brewing. This attitude is in contrast with his previous optimism following visits with bank officers
and public officials in several creditor nations. Upon announcing the debt-bond exchange plan
in late December, the Mexican government predicted that a large number of its approximately
600 foreign creditor banks would offer to exchange debt paper at a 50% discount of face value for
up to $10 billion in 20-year government bonds. To back its securities, Mexico City would acquire
US Treasury zero-coupon bonds with an initial investment of $2 billion derived from its foreign
reserves. If the banks had accepted the scheme, Mexico would have saved about $900 million per
year in interest on reducing its total foreign debt by $20 billion. After two months of negotiations,
however, the Mexican government managed to reduce its foreign bank debt by only $3.665 billion.
The average discount on face value was 30.23%, resulting in a total savings on interest payments
during the 20-year period of $2.645 billion. At a March 18 symposium marking the 50th anniversary
of Mexico's oil industry nationalization, Gurria told participants that results of the debt-bond swap
plan were modest. He said Mexico is currently paying some $9 billion in interest per year on the
foreign debt, equivalent to between 4 and 5% of the gross domestic product (GDP). Gurria's figures
are somewhat more "optimistic" than those appearing in a recent report by the Banco de Mexico.
According to the Banco, in the 1982-1987 period, net capital transfers to the exterior totaled $67
billion. Some Mexican analysts are predicting yet another arduous set of refinancing negotiations
next year. Considering the disappointing results of the debt-bond exchange program, Mexico is
scheduled to pay up to $14 or $15 billion this year on the foreign debt. Given the decline in oil
prices and a domestic anti-inflationary policy package which has few prospects of revitalizing the
economy, resumption of debt restructuring negotiations next year is almost inevitable. On Dec.
29, Finance Secretary Gustavo Petricioli described the bond plan as the second major attempt to
alleviate Mexico's debt burden without invoking a payment moratorium. This initiative followed
on the heels of the collapse of the so-called Baker Plan, the US government's creation for Third
World debt relief. The introduction of the debt-bond swap project made Mexico the first of the
Group of Eight to operationalize a recommendation adopted at the 1987 Acapulco summit, i.e.,
incorporation of the real (discounted) value of Third World debt as expressed in the secondary
international financial market. The failure of the Mexican exchange program or its partial success in
the parlance of diplomats also represented a reversal for Morgan Guaranty Trust. Morgan Guaranty
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pushed the swap plan in the hopes of displacing Citicorp as Mexico's principal creditor bank,
among other reasons. Citicorp refused to participate in the debt-bond swap, and placed $3 billion
in reserve to cover losses on Third World loans. Economists consulted by Prensa Latina indicated
that the disappointing outcome of the debt-bond swap for Mexico a country boasting a record
of punctuality on debt repayments and a history of preference for cooperation with creditors as
opposed to confrontation has demonstrated for many Latin American governments the necessity of
forming a common front on the debt problem. Jeffrey Sachs, author of an economic shock treatment
plan applied in Bolivia and former consultant to the Brazilian government on foreign debt issues,
told participants at a recent conference in Mexico City focused on inflation, that Latin America
lacks a strategy to pressure creditors. He said that crisis conditions in Mexico would continue in
the absence of a more "realistic" debt payment agreements. Sachs, who is hardly suspect of leftist
inclinations, said that the capacity for sacrifice in Latin American countries has been exhausted.
Discussion of the tabu topic of forming a type of debtor nation coordinating council, he added, must
be renewed by regional governments. The deterioration of Latin American economies is hardly
a gratuitous event. After five years of economic adjustments dictated by creditor nations via the
International Monetary Fund, Latin America as a whole is the same or worse conditions than in
1982 when the debt crisis began. In the same period, the region has dedicated more than a third of
its aggregate exports to debt repayment. Meanwhile, the debt which now totals about $410 billion
has not been reduced. Foreign investment has declined and domestic savings are scarce, since most
are channeled toward interest payments on new credit to make previuos interest payments. Latin
America is unable to resume domestic investment adequate to break out of economic stagnation.
At the same time, the region is besieged by a growing protectionist fervor that erodes prices for its
exports. Recently, the World Bank reported that the major debtors continue in economic decline,
which threatens not only the stability of new democratic governments, but also those governments
which opted for cooperation rather than confrontation with creditors. This reluctance to confront
creditors with demands has also exacted a high social cost. Public spending by governments in
the region, falling real wages, and the exacerbation of domestic inequities in most countries in the
region are reflected as well in increased rates of un- and underemployment and inflation. The latter
call forth attempts to bring the economy under via new austerity measures. The Latin American
problematic summarized in a "decade of lost development" alongside discouraging prospects for
world economic growth and the political will for the construction of a more equitable international
economic order, have produced what appear to be objective conditions to formulating a new
"debtors front." Cooperation by debtor nations in presenting demands to creditors appears to be
necessary if Latin America genuinely desires a solution to the debt crisis before the year 2000, and
with this, the possibility for reconstituting sustained and independent development.
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